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The Personalist Foundations
of the Ethics of Reproduction!
John F. Crosby

The author, who is presently at the International Academy of
Philosophy in the Principality of Liechtenstein, gave thefollowing address
at the Bay Area Conference on the Ethics of Human Reproduction. It is
reprinted here with permissionfrom Dr. Damian Fedoryka, president of
Christendom College, Front Royal, Virginia.

On the occasion of being made a cardinal in 1879, John Henry Newman
gave a famous speech in Rome, in which he said of his life's work, "For
thirty, forty, fifty years I have resisted to the best of my powers the spirit of
Liberalism in religion." He proceeded to explain just what this life-long
adversary of his was. He said :
Liberalism in religion is the doctrine that there is no positive truth in religion, but
that one creed is as good as another . . .. It is inconsistent with any recognition of
any religion, as true. It teaches that all are to be tolerated, for all are matters of
opinion. Revealed religion is not a truth, but a sentiment and a taste; not an
objective fact, not miraculous; and it is the right of each individual to make it say
just what strikes his fancy.

In this liberalism we all recognize the subjectivism and relativism which are
second nature to so many people today, and which are such an impediment
to the reception of the Vatican instruction on reproductive technology,
and indeed an impediment to all of Catholic moral teaching insofar as this
teaching talks of objectively valid moral norms, which human beings did
not devise.
There is, however, something in Newman's address which may surprise
you. At the end of it, reflecting on the future of liberalism and Christianity,
he says:
Christianity has been too often in what seemed deadly peril that we should fear
for it any new trial now. So far is certain; on the other hand, what is uncertain,
and in these great contests commonly is uncertain, and what is commonly a great
surprise, when it is witnessed , is the particular mode by which , in the event ,
Providence rescues and saves His elect inheritance. Sometimes our enemy is
turned into a friend; sometimes he is despoiled of that special virulence of evil
which was so threatening ... .
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It is surprising, is it not, that Newman considers whether the enemy which
is liberalism might not yet be "turned into a friend" and "despoiled of its
virulence of evil". Of course Newman does not mean that Christianity
could ever make its peace with the idea that "one creed is as good as
another". What he means, I think, is that this liberalism may be a
manifestation of a deeper movement of thought, and that this deeper
movement of thought may bear within itself energies and ideas which can
be appropriated by Christianity, and which can even enrich Christianity,
and enrich it at the very time that Christianity repels as abhorrent to itself
the relativism of liberalism.
What might this deeper movement of thought be? We can get a glimpse
of it in Newman himself. While Newman was absolutely committed to the
objective truth of revelation, as we have just heard, he was at the same time
extraordinarily sensitive to the subjectivity of belief. He was not only
concerned with believing what is in itself true, but also with believing it in
such a way that our existence is transformed through our believing. He did
not think it was enough to lead people to give just any assent to the truth;
he distinguished between real and notional assent, and held that a merely
notional assent, even if its object were ever so true, cannot support a
committed religious existence. He held that believers have to give a real
assent to revelation, a concrete, imaginative assent in which they assent not
just with their mind, but with their whole being. This is why Newman was
so sharply critical of a certain kind of apologetics which tried to give
formal demonstrations of the truths about God and revelation . Newman
said of such demonstrations that they "do not warm me and enlighten me;
they do not take away the winter of my desolation, or make the buds
unfold and the leaves grow within me, and my moral being rejoice."
Newman was looking for an experiential knowledge of God; only concrete
experiential religious knowledge could take away the winter of his
desolation . But the traditional demonstrations gave him only abstract
knowledge about God , and so seemed to him barren. Newman tried,
instead, to find God in conscience, for there, he thought, God can be
encountered, not just inferred but encountered, and in this encounter we
can give a real assent to His being. You see, then, why I say that Newman
was especially sensitive to the subjectivity of religious belief; he was not
only concerned with the objective truth about God, but also with the lived
experience of God .

An Additional Observation

One more observation on Newman . One of the richest and most original
parts of Newman's work is his probing of the subjectivity of the believer,
and attempting to make it deeper and more truthful. Newman's thought
would not have its seminal power and its unique fascinating character, nor
would it be able to touch us so deeply, if Newman had not taken his turn
toward the subjectivity of belief. This means that Newman did not just
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react against liberalism, but appropriated for his faith the awakening to
personal subjectivity which underlies it, even as he rejected its
subjectivism, and in this way he tried to deprive an enemy of its special
virulence of evil, and even to turn him into a friend.
I have begun with Newman because it seems to me that what he did for
our understanding of religious belief, we have to do for our understanding
of man. In the modern period there really has occurred something which
can be called "the discovery of the person and of personal subjectivity".
This is a dangerous movement of thought, and it has spawned the crippling
subjectivism which we see all around us , and which makes Catholic moral
teaching seem unintelligible to many of our contemporaries. But it is not to
be simply rejected; for we can deepen our understanding of man by
considering him as person, and by probing his subjectivity and freedom .
This is not just my opinion; as everyone knows, it is also the view of John
Paul II, for whom the future of the Christian understanding of man lies in
the direction of a new Christian personalism. And this personalism is not
just favored by a pope; it is incorporated in many ways in the documents of
Vatican II. What , for example, is the Council's Declaration on Religious
Liberty if not a monument to this personalism?
And so I will venture to speak of the autonomy of the person, and the
su bjectivity of the person, knowing full well that these terms are often used
in a destructive and anti-Christian sense, but at the same time convinced
that, probed deeply enough, they will yield up a Christian sense. Let us
hope that in our deliberations together we will find fulfilled the scriptural
promise that Christians will be able to handle poisonous serpents without
being harmed by them .
I have been asked to speak to you about man as a spiritual being. I
propose to attempt this by unfolding the structure of man as person; for it
seems to me that the spiritual nature of man is nothing other than his
personal nature. Of course an inquiry into man as spiritual being will
usually include some reflections on the immateriality of spirit, and I will
not have enough time to raise the question of what is immaterial in man.
But I think that by approaching the spirituality of man through his
personality, we can lay the foundation for important new arguments for
the immateriality ofthe most inward part of man, and below I shall indicate
some of them. And besides, there is a very considerable personalist
contribution to be made to our understanding of man as spirit, even apart
from the question of the immateriality of spirit.
There are 0 bviously great pastoral advantages in speaking the language
of a personalist understanding of man; the more we speak of man as
person, and express moral truths in a personalist way, the more we are
likely to be heard . But it is not primarily these pastoral advantages which I
want to explore, but the purely theoretical enrichment which we can
expect from a Christian personalism.
There are three highly significant and revealing aspects of man as person
which will form the main points of reference of my talk.
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Major Points of Reference
I. I begin where Karol Wojtylia often begins in his reflections on the
human person, namely with the inwardness of the person. In "Gaudium et
spes", the Council fathers speak of the same thing under the name of the
interiority of the person. This inwardness is manifested, I believe, in the
power of the person to act through himself, out of himself, or in other
words, to perform acts which are radically his own. We know what it is to
act in such a way that we merely transmit what originates in others rather
than act on our own and out of ourselves. This happens when, for example,
we repeat the opinions or imitate the practices of someone without really
understanding those opinions or practices, and thus without having those
opinions and practices as our own, as the imitated person has them as his
own. This is, in fact, the form of all merely conventional opining and
acting. We come alive as persons only when we make our opinions and
practices our own; only then do we act out of ourselves, and give evidence
of our inwardness as persons.
This throws some light on what Vatican II taught about the respect
which must be shown for the religious liberty of all persons. The idea
behind this respect seems to be that coercion hinders persons in forming
religious convictions which are entirely their own, and thus hinders them
in living as persons. Even if that which persons are coerced to hold is
objectively true, and even if this coercion unifies the whole society in the
truth, persons are violated by the coercion. One ought to respect persons
even if one thereby pays the price of many people falling into error and of
society losing its unity in the truth.
Some may want to object already at this point, saying that this train of
thought is nothing but a concession to subjectivism. One may say that I am
speaking as if the main thing for each person is that his opinions and
practices be his own, and that it doesn't much matter if they are true
opinions and justified practices. But to focus on the inwardness of the
person involves no such subjectivism;just the contrary. It is not difficult to
show that the person achieves this inwardness precisely in encountering
what is objectively valid, and it is especially easy to show this by referring
to the moral life.
As long as I am just motivated by what is subjectively agreeable, I tend
to lose my power of acting through myself. When Oscar Wilde looked
back on his life of unrestrained pleasure-seeking and gratification, he said,
"I ceased to be captain of my soul." But when we let ourselves be motivated
primarily by what is objectively good and right, when we recognize the
demands which the good makes of us, it is different. No one who is in the
habit of serving what is good and right ever complained with the words of
Oscar Wilde, "I ceased to be captain of my soul." Though that which is
objectively good and worthy may demand from us a commitment which
imposes pain and sacrifice, it never tends to cramp and hinder our
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acting through ourselves; it never dethrones us as persons when we submit
to it, or carries us away with a seductive sirensong. On the contrary; the
demands of right and wrong take us seriously as persons; they stir up in us
the depth of conscience, which is the supreme inwardness ofthe person. It
is never so much we ourselves who act, as when our acting is a matter of
conscience. In conscience we come fully alive as persons, and experience in
ourselves our inwardness, and manifest this inwardness to others.
All of this is well expressed by the Thomas More of the play, A Manior
All Seasons. More says to Norfolk:
I will not give in because I oppose it - I do - not my pride, not my spleen, nor
any other of my appetites but 1 do - I (MO RE goes up to him andfeels him up
and down like an animal . . . .) Is there no single sinew in the midst of this that
serves no appetite of Norfolk's but is just Norfolk? (pp. 71-72)

Notice that it is in a matter of conscience, in which he discerns the demands
of the moral law, that Thomas More can most emphatically and
expressively say, "I", and be called by his name. Insofar as he is subject to
appetites and subjective wants, this "I" gets lost, for these appetites do not
reach down into the "I", and have no power to call it into life. Now this "I"
is nothing other than the inwardness of the person.
Obstacles to Inwardness
We have, then, found three obstacles to the inwardness of the person.
This inwardness is weakened, first , by merely conventional acting;
secondly by coercion; and finally, by being dominated by appetite and the
merely agreeable. What do not - precisely do not - weaken or eliminate
this inwardness, are the demands of right and wrong, for these demands
have a power of eliciting this inwardness like nothing else has. Indeed, we
discover the ultimate depth of our inwardness only in relation to these
demands, for it is in conscience that we achieve this depth of inwardness,
and conscience is nothing else but that spiritual organ which is sensitive to
the demands of right and wrong.
You see, then, that the inwardness of the person, rightly understood , has
no tendency to imply subjectivism, or to loosen in any way the relation
between the person and the objective moral law. You see, in fact, that the
very opposite is the case.
2. If we recall the Scholastic axiom, agere sequitur esse, "as a thing is , so
it acts," we are led to the second aspect of the person which I want to
discuss with you. If the acting proper to the person is acting through
oneself, how must the being of the person be? What is that ultimate
structure of being in the person which lets the person act through himself?
It seems to me that the answer which Karol Wojtyla has given to this
question constitutes one of the most important parts of his personalistic
anthropology. He answers with a principle first formulated by the Roman
jurists: persona est sui iuris. "A person is a being of his own", or "A person
is a being which exists in his own right." Rendering more freely into a
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familiar idiom, we can say, "A person is an end in himself, he exists in a
sense for his own sake." Wojtyla's preferred way of rendering it freely is
this: the person is one who belongs to himself, or who possesses himself.
Only because the person is gathered into himself as one who belongs to
himself and possesses himself, can he act through himself. If the person
were so strongly integrated into his surroundings as to be a mere part of
them, and were thus eliminated as a being o/his own, he could not possibly
act with the inwardness of which I was speaking, that is, he could not act
through himself.
Let us try to find a revealing experience of our self-possession. We all
know what it is to be in a conscious condition which is the very opposite of
self-possession, namely in a condition of distraction and dispersion. In this
condition we are lost in the things around us. Our inwardness is weakened,
so that we lack a firm ground in ourselves on which to stand in dealing with
the impressions which we receive and the experiences which we undergo .
This weakening of our inwardness can , under certain circumstances, go
very far, as when a person watches television in a very passive way. The
glazed look on his face reveals the far-reaching loss of himself in that at
which he is looking. Such a state of consciousness approaches a mere
succession of impressions, in which memory in all its deeper forms tends to
be extinguished, and the person tends to live completely in the present
impression, and to be unable to take any spiritual distance to it. Such a
person does not amount to a subject consciously facing some object. He
cannot really originate any life and activity which is his own, but he rather
tends to be borne along by what happens to him and what happens in him.
It is clear that in this dispersed state of consciousness the person loses
possession of himself, and tends, thereby, to be weakened as person.
Coming to Center of One's Being
But in this condition of inner dispersion, a person has the power of what
is expressively called recollecting himself. This means that he can come to
himself. He can recover the center of his being. He can take a distance to
what he experiences, and awaken to it. He can become a subject facing an
objective world, and not just the shadow cast in consciousness by the
objective world. In all this he comes alive as person, and revives as a being
of his own. But what is this coming alive as person but a taking possession
of himself? Before recollecting himself he was possessed by the objects of
experience; now he deals with them out of his self-possession. We find in
the experience of recollection exactly what we are looking for; in
recollecting ourselves we experience self-possession, and we experience the
fullness of personal life, and we experience the connection between the
two. We experience this fullness as consisting in self-possession.
This is perhaps the place to report the observation of Josef Pieper (The
Philosophical Act) that, according to the tradition of Western philosophy,
the essence of spirit lies precisely in this self-possession. You see, then, why
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I think that a philosophy and metaphysics of the person is capable of
deepening our understanding of man as a spiritual being.
And yet despite this link with the tradition, I am sure that, with my
reflection on recollection, I revive in some people the suspicion that I will,
after all, not succeed in avoiding su bjectivism. For it will be 0 bjected to me
that a person is a person whether recollected or not, whether in full
possession of himself or not. One will say that, by making so much of
recollection in my account of the person, I make it difficult to understand
how the embryo could be a person, since the embryo does not yet have a
conscious life which could be more or less recollected. One will say that I
have given up a metaphysical analysis of the person in favor of a merely
psychological one.
I answer that of course the being of the person does not exhaust itself in
conscious self-presence, and that of course a person belongs to himself no
matter what his conscious condition, and, in fact , can exist even in the
absence of any conscious life. My idea is simply that a person actualizes his
personal being most fully in recollection, and that therefore personal being
shows itself most clearly for what it is in and through recollected selfpresence. Wojtyla has said much about the way in which the metaphysical
structure of personal being shows itself in Erleben, in conscious selfpresence. He warns against a dualism of metaphysical being, on the one
hand , and consciousness, on the other, as if our metaphysical being were
completely hidden from our conscious self-presence, or as if conscious
self-presence were in no way formed by the metaphysical truth of our
being. He is surely right to say that the basic structure of the person, who is
sui iuris and belongs to himself, manifests itself in - does not exhaust itself
in, but manifests itself in - consciousness.
To See More Clearly

Those who want to see more clearly the continuity of our approach to
the human person with the tradition of Western metaphysics, should
consider that in talking of the person as belonging to himself, and acting
through himself, we are in effect speaking of the substantiality of the
person. For a substance is nothing but a being which exists not as the part
or property of another, but on its own, standing in itself. My thesis,
expressed in terms of substance, is simply that a being which is capable of
recollection must have a particular perfection of su bstantiality, and such a
being gives evidence of this perfection in a uniquely revealing way in the
experience of recollecting itself.
You see, then, that there is no need to playoff the experience of the
person against the being of the person, and you see why Wojtyla and others
think that the approach to the being of the person through the experience
of the person ought to be cultivated more seriously than it has been
cultivated in the Christian philosophical tradition.
But there is another objection which I have to face from the critics of
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modern subjectivism. One will say that this self-possession of the person is
just another name for the autonomy of the person, and that if you take
autonomy to be one of the most significant facts about the person, you
undermine all subsequent ethical analysis . For then you play right into the
hands of those who say that since persons belong to themselves and are
their own, they have to be understood primarily as holders of rights, such
as a right over their bodies, or a right over their lives. Such rights are then
taken as justifying say, a woman renting out her uterus as an incu bator, or
as justifying a suffering patient requesting a lethal injection.
My response is this. Just as the idea of an agent intellect was often
understood in a pantheistic way in the middle ages, and was nevertheless
retained by St. Thomas, who gave it a theistic interpretation, so the idea of
the autonomy of the person has to be retained. Our task is to despoil it of
the virulence of evil which it all too often has, and to make it fruitful for atrue vision of the human person. Just a couple of thoughts on how this
might be done.
a) We have to remember that though the person belongs to himself, he
nevertheless does not exist through himself. He is not a divine being. He
rather exists through God . But in existing through God , he comes to
belong to God . Depending on God for existence, which is defacto relation,
gives rise to belonging to God, a de iure relation . And so the human
person, though as person he is his own, as creature is not his own, but is
God's. There is in the human person a paradoxical unity of selfhood and
dependency, of being anchored in himself and being anchored in God . The
idea of the autonomy of the person can be made to serve and enrich the
Christian understanding of man as long as it is not divinized, but keeps its
place within this paradoxical unity.
I know of no better way to probe this unity of autonomy and theonomy,
as it could be called, than by returning to the experience of recollection. It
is no accident that almost all the accounts of recollection which we have
are found in religious writers (recall, for instance, what authors such as
Guardini and von Hildebrand have written on recollection). For as
everyone with only a little experience of the religious life knows, nothing
has such power to recollect as turning to God, and immersing ourselves in
the ultimacy and absoluteness of God ; in this encounter with God we
return to ourselves , we recover ourselves, and retake possession of
ourselves. In recollection we can "read" the creaturely character of our
self-possession.
St. Thomas Expresses Unity
This unity of autonomy and theonomy in the human person is expressed
profoundly, though less experientially, by St. Thomas Aquinas in the
important Chapter III of the Summa Contra Gentiles, III, where he
explains why divine providence governs rational creatures for their own
sake. In speaking of God exercising providence over man, and governing
50

Linacre Quarterly

him, he expresses the theonomy of the human person. In speaking of God
governing man for his own (that is, man's own) sake, he expresses the
autonomy of man as person.
You see, then, how we can despoil the Egyptians as we go out of Egypt,
appropriating for our own purposes the autonomy of the human person.
And once we accomplish this work of appropriation, we can speak of the
autonomy of the person without making any least concessions in our
ethical analyses. Thus for instance a suffering patient has no right to
request a lethal injection, because as creature he is not in every respect his
own; he would act impiously towards the one to whom he belongs by
making the ultimate disposition over his life of directly ending his life.
b) One other thought on the fruitfulness of the concept of personal
autonomy . In his profound study, Love and Responsibility, Karol Wojtyla
has tried to revision the love between man and woman in terms of the
self-possession of the human person. His thought is that it is only because
each person belongs to himself and is his own, that he can give himself
away in a spousal way. If men and women were not sui iuris, there could be
no spousal self-donation between them, nor could they perform the
consent of marriage. There is no reason, but no reason at all, why the
self-possession of the person should be explained merely in terms of rights
which the person has; it should also be explained in terms of the power of
self-donation which he has and which surely reveals his self-possession
more fully than does his ability to be a right-holder.
Notice that we have found two ways in which the self-possession of the
person underlies the acting of the person. It underlies all acting through
himself, as we saw, and it underlies, as it were a second time, all such acting
when it is the acting of spousal self-donation.
N ow consider how fruitful it is for ethical analysis to think of the love of
man and woman in terms of self-donation. John Paul thinks that we can,
on this basis, show in a particularly convincing way the unity of the sexual
union of spouses , and openness to procreation. His claim is that the sexual
union of spouses, when it is sterilized' and deprived of its procreative
possibility, is gravely comprised as an expression of spousal self-donation,
and is even turned into something opposed to self-donation; that the
possibility of procreation must remain open if the spouses are to give
themselves to each other without reserve and without deformation of their
love. I do not mean to reproduce his whole analysis right now, but if he is
right, then he has advanced an extremely attractive "personalist"
argument in behalf of this difficult teaching of the Church. It is an
argument based on spousal love as a self-donation of persons, and selfdonation is, in turn, based on the self-possession of persons. You see then
how erroneous is the view that persons, once recognized as having the
autonomy of self-possession, can only become solitary, promethean
beings.
And it is not just the question of artificial contraception which is
illuminated by understanding the spousal union as a union of selfAugust, 1988
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donation. The issue of artificial fertilization is also illuminated. For if the
spousal union had nothing to do with self-donation but were only say the
exercise of "legalized lust", why would it be irreplaceable as the direct
origin of a new human person? If it provided the spouses nothing but the
relief of their concupiscence, what would be lost in the way of deep human
meaning if one bypassed it as the direct source of a new human being and
instead brought one into existence in vitro? Only because in the spousal
union the spouses "make a sincere gift of themselves one to another," as the
Council put it, and do not exploit each other for their own gratification,
does it become a serious question whether this spousal union can ever be
replaced by artificial means of fertilization . As I say, this self-donation is
possible only in beings who have the autonomy of being sui iuris and of
possessing themselves in the sense explained.
Reflections Began on Person

We began our reflections on the person with the acting proper to the
person , which, as we saw, is acting through oneself, and have proceeded to
the being proper to one who can act in this way, which as we saw is the
being of belonging to oneself and existing as an end in oneself.
3. I proceed now to the third aspect of personal being which I want to
discuss with you, and that is the unrepeatability of the person. This , too , is
an aspect of the perso n which, as far as I can see, has come into prominence
only in recent centuries. It is, to my mind, a particularly significant aspect
of the person, and deeply reveals to us man precisely as person.
Let us suppose a person who loves another. And let us suppose that it is
proposed to this person that the beloved person be removed from his life
for good, but at the same time be replaced by another person just like the
beloved perso n. The one who loves will, of course, not accept the idea that
he can continue to love the other in the same way after this exchange of
persons. No less would he reject the proposal not just to replace the
beloved with an equivalent person, but to improve on the beloved with a
better person, as if he could love this new person with the same love with
which he loved the previous person, only with the love having been made
more ardent by the superiority of the new person. He will protest that he
does not love an exemplar of certain repeatable traits , but this particular
person, who is unrepeatable. Precisely the attitude of love for another
makes us alive to this unrepeatability in persons.
This unrepeatability is too often identified with the unrepeatability of
the genetic makeup of a human being, or of those traits of race,
temperament, intelligence, etc., which depend on the genetic makeup of an
individual. These traits are indeed woven together in a given individual in a
way which is hardly ever repeated by other individuals, but this is only a
relative unrepeatability; there is, after all, no absurdity in exactly these
traits being repeated in exactly these interconnections in a second and a
third individual, and indeed, this repeating is just what happens in the case
52

Linacre Quarterly

of identical twins. The unrepeatability of which we speak lies at a deeper
level in a human being. It lies in the depths of his personal being; perhaps
we could say that it is not a relative but an absolute unrepeatability.
Let us try to understand the absolute unrepeatability of the person in
terms of the self-possession which we were just discussing. We begin by
considering things which really are in a sense repeatable. Consider for
example one of the millions of copies of today's newspaper; whatever it
contains is almost entirely repeated by all the many other copies; it is
nothing butthe bearer of a content which is just as well borne by each of
the millions of copies. If I should lose my copy, my loss can be entirely
replaced by buying a new copy, so that the interest which I took in reading
the first is exactly like, and perhaps even identically the same as, my
interest in reading the second; for my interest has as its object simply
"today's newspaper," and not this copy of it as distinct from that · one,
though of course my interest requires some individual copy or other. If
each human person were related to "man" or to "the human person" as an
individual newspaper is related to "today's newspaper"; if each human
person were merely a copy of "the human person"; if each were a mere
exemplar or specimen of it, then he would be abolished as person, and it
would after all not be the human person who is instantiated by the
individual. And why? Because as exemplar a human person would cease to
be what we found him to be above in #2: he would cease to stand in himself
and belong to himself and have a being of his own; his whole being would
instead lie in the general type, "the human person," which would belong as
much to all other human individuals which instantiate it as it belongs to
himself. As exemplar, a human person would not be anchored in himself in
the sense of being sui iuris, but would exist for the sake of that which he
exemplifies. The truth is that a human person is no more a mere exemplar
of a type than he is a mere instrumental means for realizing some result: his
belonging to himself excludes the former no less than the latter. It follows
that the human person must have his human nature, and much else which
he has besides, as unrepeatably his own; he must be unrepeatably himself if
he is to have that "being of his own" which we found above to belong to
persons.
A Remarkable Fact

With this we encounter one ofthe most remarkable facts about persons:
we experience such an amazing concreteness in persons; most non-persons
are by contrast experienced as abstract. This concreteness, this density and
heaviness of existence, is nothing but an aspect of the unrepeatability of
the person; it comes from the fact that the person is so strongly a being of
his own, that he is never a mere exemplar of his kind, or of the attributes
which he has. The abstractness of most non-persons comes from the fact
that what we experience in them is not inseparably one with their concrete
being but is a kind of general type which can as well be instantiated in other
beings of the same kind.
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We catch sight here for the first time of an all-important aspect of
personal being, namely of the worth or dignity of the person. Precisely in
grasping this concreteness of the person, we feel - we do not infer it but we
spontaneously feel it, whether we want to or not - the worth of the person,
and we feel a respect for the other, and even the beginnings of something
like love for the other. It is no accident that I made my first approach to the
unrepeatability of the person through the experience of loving a person.
We can, of course, find worth and ontological dignity in the basic powers
of the person, such as the power to understand and to choose freely; but it
is above all when we experience these powers as possessed by a particular
person that we strongly experience what we call the worth or dignity of the
person.
This means that we should take care not to speak of the dignity of the
person as if it were conferred from without by God, or as if it were
intelligible only by directly setting the person in relation to God. Though
this dignity is ultimately grounded in God, it is at the same time entirely
intrinsic to the person, and grows out of the person at exactly that point at
which the person is a being of his own. We do not have to get people to
share our faith as a condition for understanding the dignity of the person.
It is enough, at least for a start, if we can get them to listen more closely to
their experience of persons.
One last thought on unrepeatability. It enables us to understand why it is
that, though there are so many human persons, each one exists as if it were
the only one, and never as merely "one among many". If each human being
merely exemplified the human species and the various excellences of which
human beings are capable, it would follow that the more human beings
there are, the more each would get reduced to insignificance in comparison
to all the many others. But the person, through his unrepeatability, has in
himself that which can never be reduced to insignificance by ever so many
others.
As we have seen, this unrepeatability is understood precisely in terms of
the belonging of the person to himself, which means that it belongs to the
autonomy of the person. I suppose that those who are suspicious of all talk
of the autonomy of the person will be surprised to find that the study of this
autonomy does not just lead to a theory of the person as subject of rights,
but leads into the depths of the being and the preciousness of the person.
Arguments for Immateriality
Here we might make a brief mention of some of the arguments for the
immateriality of the core of the person to which I referred above when I
was reflecting on what it means to say that man is a spiritual being. Could it
not be shown that no material being can act through itself in the sense in
which the person acts through itself? That no material being can take
possession of itself as persons can and must? That nothing material can
have the unrepeatability which we have found in persons? Of course, the
bodies of persons participate in various ways in the unrepeatability of the
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person, but do they not have unrepeatability in a derived and secondary
way? Is it not non-bodily and non-material being which is required as the
primary "seat" of this unrepeatability? As I already said, these questions
will have to remain only questions in this paper, but I did not want to omit
at least a mention of them, and an indication of the direction in which, in
my opinion, the answers to them lie.
Surely the unrepeatability of the person, even if developed only to the
point to which we have developed it, can be made fruitful for the issues of
bioethics which we want to study at this conference. On the basis of this
unrepeatability, we understand better the unconditional respect which
must be shown to all the persons involved in the use of the newest
reproductive technology. We understand that it is not a morally indifferent
matter how persons come into existence, but that the procreation of them
must be appropriate to the unrepeatable personhood of each. If a new
human being were just another specimen of the human species, and were
related to the species in basically the same way any animal is related to its
species, then what is so ethically disturbing about artificial methods of
bringing a new human being into existence? Why would these methods be
fundamentally more problematic with human beings than with animals?
Indeed, what would be wrong with simply destroying defective specimens
ofthe human species, if we were really dealing with specimens? There is an
ethical issue here, because human beings are not specimens but persons,
and as persons are unrepeatable. Of course I do not think that all the
difficult ethical questions which might be asked about this reproductive
technology can be easily answered by invoking the unrepeatability of
persons, but this unrepeatability has to form the constant background of
all our deliberations on these questions, otherwise we have no chance of
reaching the truth about them.
To conclude. All Christians have to reject subjectivism. We all have to
reject the doctrine, first formulated by the Greek sophist, Progatoras, that
"man is the measure of all things, of the things that are, that they are, and
of the things that are not, that they are not." But in rejecting subjectivism,
we must not reject the modern attention to and concern with the
subjectivity of the person. For this turn to personal subjectivity can be
deprived of its potential virulence of evil, and be transformed into a friend
of philosophical realism, and be made to serve the development of a
Christian humanism, and of Christian ethics.
Reference
I. Address given at the Bay Area Conference on the Ethics of Human Reproduction,
San Francisco, July 27-31 , 1987.

August, 1988

55

